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Abstract 
 
In recent years an increasing number of scholarly contributions on EU 
international actorness focus on notions of ‘normative, value-driven external policy’. 
This is in opposition to the usual realist view of an EU unable to make its voice heard 
when real crisis emerges, mostly due to its lack of military capabilities, or the criticism 
of proponents of the term ‘fortress Europe’, for whom the EU merely serves as a 
vehicle to reinforce member states’ economic interests vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
Informed by liberal and constructivist approaches, these works have given rise to 
concepts of ‘civilian’, ‘normative’, ‘ethical’ or ‘gentle’ power Europe. All these works 
point to the unique role that the EU has played and could play on the international 
stage as a promoter of its distinctive norms, which range from multilateralism to 
sustainable peace, from democracy to human rights and rule of law. In particular, 
numerous authors identify in the respect of human rights one of the main tenets of EU 
international identity and argue that the promotion of human rights is one of the 
main foreign policy objectives of the EU.  
However, the majority of this literature presents two major shortcomings. First, it 
tends to merely analyse EU foreign policy leaving aside the foreign policies of the 
member states, uncritically assuming that they are in line with those of the EU. In this 
way, it is unable to assess the actual political impact of Europe on international 
relations, which requires the analysis of the coherence and consistency of the EU’s 
and its member states’ foreign policies. Second, the existing literature tends to reify 
the EU and to conceive it as a single international actor. This allows applying classical 
tools of foreign policy analysis, which yet are unable to make sense of the complexity 
of foreign policy within the European context.  
How can these theoretical and analytical shortcomings of the Normative 
Power Europe (NPE) concept be rectified? I argue that the NPE concept at the 
analytical level must take into account the EU member states’ foreign policies, while 
at the theoretical level it is necessary to pry open the EU’s ‘black box’ through a 
liberal constructivist conceptual framework that can explain the European foreign 
policy outcome on the basis of the material and ethical interests of the member 
states as shaped by the interaction within the EU institutional setting. After briefly 
sketching such an analytical and theoretical approach to NPE, this paper attempts 
to empirically test it in the specific case of the European promotion of human rights in 
China. What emerges is that in this case the EU appears more as a ‘normative trap’ 
rather than a normative power, where member states are ‘entrapped’ to pursue 
policies not in line with the EU normative basis.  
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Introduction: Single or Multiple European Actorness? 
A recent comparative study edited by Nathalie Tocci on the EU’s foreign policy 
and that of its main global partners, namely the US, China, India and Russia, sets the 
task to explore three main research questions to assess their normativeness: “what an 
actor wants (its goals), how it acts (the deployment of its policy means) and what it 
achieves (its impact)”.1 This appears a welcome endeavour to clarify the under-
specified literature on EU normative foreign policy dominated by Ian Manners’ 
conceptualisation of Normative Power Europe.2 Yet it neglects an important point: 
falling in line with the contemporary characterisation of the EU as an international 
actor, it fails to address the internal complexity of the EU and the coexistence of 
national, intergovernmental and supranational dynamics in EU foreign policy. Such 
an approach thus encounters two major shortcomings.  
First, it addresses the very important questions mentioned above to the wrong 
subject matter. It asks what the EU (actor) wants (goals), wrongly supposing that 
each European actor shares a similar identity and interest, instead of asking what the 
member states, the Commission and the Council (actors) want (goals). Similarly, it 
asks how the EU (actor) acts (means) instead of asking what the competences and 
thus the instruments (means) deployed by the member states, the Commission or the 
Council (actors) are, uncritically assuming the oft undemonstrated coherence and 
consistency of their actions. Eventually, it assesses the impact of EU foreign policy 
without considering the achievements (impact) of the member states’ foreign 
policies, which may or may not be in line with those of the EU institutions. 
Second, the above study compares the incomparable with similar tools. As the 
US, China, India and Russia, differently from the EU, are internationally recognised 
states, the study of their foreign policies and their normative character can make use 
of the traditional tools developed by the classical school of foreign policy analysis. 
This is not granted in the case of the EU. In fact, several authors have argued that an 
adapted foreign policy analysis should be applied to the study of EU foreign policy.3 
                                                 
1 Tocci, Nathalie (2008), ‘Profiling Normative Foreign Policy’, in Nathalie Tocci (ed.), Who Is a 
Normative Foreign Policy Actor? The EU and its Global Partners, Brussels, Centre for European 
Policy Studies, p. 5. 
2 The first scholar to put forward the notion of Normative Power Europe is Manners, Ian (2002), 
‘Normative Power Europe: a Contradiction in Terms?’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 
40, No. 2, pp. 235-258. 
3 See, for example, White, Brian (2001), Understanding European Foreign Policy, New York, 
Palgrave. 
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How can the theoretical and analytical shortcomings highlighted in the case of 
Tocci’s study – which are also very common in the rest of the literature on the EU’s 
normative foreign policy – be rectified? I argue that the NPE concept at the 
analytical level must take into account the EU member states’ foreign policies, while 
at the theoretical level it is necessary to explore the inside of Normative Power 
Europe and pry open the EU ‘black box’ through a liberal constructivist conceptual 
framework that can explain the European foreign policy outcome on the basis of the 
material and ethical interests of its member states as shaped by the interaction within 
the EU institutional setting.  
This paper puts forward such an approach and empirically tests it in the specific 
case of the European promotion of human rights in China, perhaps the most 
significant actor for the redefinition of a human rights regime in Asia and thus the 
most important ‘Gordian knot’ to untie for the EU to successfully and normatively 
influence human rights evolution in Asia. What emerges is that in the case of China 
the EU appears more as a ‘normative trap’, where member states are ‘entrapped’ 
to pursue policies not in line with the EU normative basis, rather than as a normative 
power. 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section develops an original theoreti-
cal and analytical framework to study the normative dimension of European foreign 
policy. The remaining three sections apply the framework thus elaborated to the 
study of the European promotion of human rights in China. This serves three purposes: 
first, it reformulates the major questions put forward in Tocci’s study in light of the 
analytical and theoretical framework proposed. Second, it shows a complete 
picture of the European normative approach to one of the most significant countries 
in Asia and thus reveals the European ability and limits in redefining the normative 
human rights structure abroad. Third, it proves the hermeneutical and explanatory 
validity of the framework proposed for the study of European normative foreign 
policy tout court and thus helps closing a research gap. 
 
Analytical and Theoretical Framework for the Study of Normative Power Europe 
In the European context the study of foreign policy and normative foreign 
policy alike poses two fundamental problems, both related to the unit level of 
analysis. The first is of a theoretical nature and concerns the analyst’s choice of the 
member states as the main actors behind EU foreign policy, in a mostly intergovern-
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mental fashion, the role of institutions, in a liberal institutionalist perspective, or the 
interaction among these two levels, in a social constructivist perspective.  
The second issue is of an analytical nature and concerns the level of European 
governance that is selected to study foreign policy in the European context: the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), a comprehensive European Union 
foreign policy system comprising the CFSP and the European Community (EC) level, 
or an enlarged concept of European foreign policy, which adds to these two 
dimensions the member states’ foreign policies.  
This section intends to briefly sketch an appropriate analytical and theoretical 
approach for the study of European foreign policy and to show its validity to explain 
the European – and not merely EU – normative foreign policy.  
The Analytical Level 
Analytically, most of the literature on EU foreign policy either focuses on the 
dealings and workings of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, mainly inspired 
by a state-centric and intergovernmentalist approach, or on EU international actor-
ness, largely embracing an institutionalist approach. Yet, each analytical approach 
has a major shortcoming: the CFSP approach fails to take into account the 
important level of the external relations carried out by the European Community, 
whose interconnectedness with the CFSP policies has become increasingly difficult to 
ignore; 4 instead, the EU-as-an-international-actor approach tends to only make 
reference to the EU and its main institutions, while overlooking the analysis of member 
states’ foreign policies, thus uncritically reifying the EU.5 
In order to avoid these main shortcomings, i.e. reductionism and reification, it is 
necessary to embrace analytical conceptualizations of foreign policy in the 
European context that can incorporate the internal complexity of Europe and the 
multiple realities that exist within its foreign policy decision-making system. To this end, 
it is argued that Brian White’s description of Europe as a “unique but also non unitary 
international actor […] constituted for foreign policy purposes by three different 
types of policy” is useful.6 He suggests that European international actorness as well 
as its foreign policy should be seen as the dynamic combination of the three types of 
                                                 
4 Tonra, Ben and Thomas Christiansen (eds.) (2004), Rethinking European Union Foreign Policy, 
Manchester, Manchester University Press, p. 2. 
5  Representative of this strand of literature is the work of Bretherton, Charlotte and John 
Vogler (1999), The European Union as a Global Actor, London, Routledge. 
6 White, op.cit., p. 24. 
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policy, namely the CFSP, the EC and the member states levels, which interact within 
the European system of external relations. 
However, while solving the problem of the analytical level of analysis, White’s 
conceptualization does not tackle the more theoretical issue of what we are looking 
at as the most important engine of European foreign policy. Put more simply, while 
White’s approach allows to describe the internal overall policy output, it does not tell 
us anything on why a specific policy output has come about. Besides, broadening 
the concept of EU foreign policy to include member states raises new questions on 
how EU foreign policy is not just affected by member states’ interaction but also how 
it influences member states’ foreign policies. I argue that this requires a theoretical 
approach that considers both the inputs coming from integration theories, mostly 
liberal institutionalism, and the recent evolution of international relations theory, 
namely social constructivism. 
The Theoretical Level 
The necessity to combine in the study of European foreign policy state agency 
and institutional structure has been recently pointed out by some authors. For Adrian 
Hyde-Price, for example, it is necessary to “consider both the material and ideational 
factors defining Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy”.7 This requires to 
account for the interest formation within the EU, which necessarily has to take into 
consideration member states’ roles as well as the role of institutions in facilitating the 
emergence of a sense of community based on shared interests, trust and a common 
identity, which in turn require to apply social constructivist tools to analyse its 
emergence both as a consequence of internal and external interaction. 
In this paper I argue that the theoretical analysis of European foreign policy 
should be premised on the important role that member states, with their 
domestically-generated interests and policy preferences, play in its formulation and 
implementation. This is not only true for the intergovernmental CFSP level, and 
naturally for the member states’ foreign policies, but also for the EC level, where the 
sharing of competences and member states’ supervision of the Commission do not 
rule out the application of intergovernmentalist approaches to study it. 
                                                 
7  Hyde-Price, Adrian (2004), ‘Interests, Institutions and Identities in the Study of European 
Foreign Policy’, in Ben Tonra and Thomas Christiansen (eds.), Rethinking European Union 
Foreign Policy, Manchester, Manchester University Press, pp. 99-113. 
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However, the intergovernmentalist approach has two major shortcomings: the 
stress on member states as the sole actors and on their exogenously-predefined 
interests, which become even more salient in a study that comprehends European 
foreign policy. According to contemporary theories of international relations, foreign 
policy cannot be seen to occur in a vacuum, where member states only deal with 
their domestic societal pressures. Transnational groups do have an influence on 
member states’ powers and eventually policy outcomes.8 Similarly, in the European 
context, the role of supranational entities has been highlighted both in the form of 
the Commission activities in the case of EC external relations and in the form of 
networks of representatives in the case of the CFSP.9 
Secondly, institutionalist approaches show that institutions do matter in the 
definition and shaping of member states’ interests and policy preferences. This is 
evidenced at two levels. Internally, institutions matter because they favour processes 
of socialization, they establish norms of behaviour that require convergence and a 
logic of appropriateness, and they involve supranational actors which can wield 
significant powers through communicative processes. This leads member states 
within EU institutions to change their domestically-defined preferences and interests. 
Externally, institutions matter for their filtering of external pressures from outside of the 
EU, as they are the vehicles through which member states can respond to external 
pressures, in the form of ‘rescuing’ their states and foreign policies.10 
Inspired by these theoretical insights, it is here maintained that a theoretical 
framework to explain European foreign policy should be based on the following 
liberal constructivist general assumptions. First, in a liberal intergovernmentalist 
perspective, member states are the basis of European foreign policy and they are 
the principal decision-makers within the three policy levels of EC external relations, 
the CFSP, and naturally their own foreign policies. Second, in a liberal constructivist 
perspective, member states’ interests and policy preferences both at EU and at 
domestic levels are assumed to be initially formed within their national boundaries 
but then also significantly shaped through the interaction within EU institutions, where 
                                                 
8  Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1996), ‘Exploring the Nature of the Beast: International Relations 
Theory and Comparative Policy Analysis Meet the European Union’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 53-80. 
9 Smith, Michael E. (2004), ‘Institutionalization, Policy Adaptation and European Foreign Policy 
Cooperation’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 95-136. 
10   Smith, Michael E. (2004), ‘Toward a Theory of EU Foreign Policy Making: Multi-level 
Governance, Domestic Politics, and National Adaptation to Europe’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy’, Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 740-758.  
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various supranational and transnational actors play significant roles.11 Third, external 
pressures from outside the EU on member states’ preferences and interests are 
important in explaining the European policy outcomes but only if they are conceived, 
in a constructivist perspective, as being filtered through EU institutions.12 
Liberal Constructivism in the Study of Normative Power Europe 
The general assumptions elaborated above can be applied to the classical 
concepts developed by the literature on the normative character of EU foreign 
policy, namely identity, interests and instruments. As set out in the introduction, this 
literature tends to uncritically consider the EU as a single actor. Therefore, this section 
discusses the three main concepts that can be singled out in the literature on EU 
normative foreign policy in light of the theoretical and analytical framework briefly 
sketched above. 
For the literature on Normative Power Europe, EU identity greatly contributes to 
the formulation and implementation of EU foreign policy. However, NPE does not 
problematise identity but almost takes it for granted through the analysis of the 
constitutive norms that are enshrined in the EU treaties, documents and official 
positions. Identity is a fundamental issue for foreign policy in the European context 
because, as Christopher Hill and William Wallace argue, “a European foreign policy 
cannot exist if a European identity does not exist”.13 Therefore, when analysing the 
explanatory power of identity in the European promotion of human rights, it is 
necessary to consider the interaction between EU identity and those of its member 
states. In light of this, the EU identity as a promoter of human rights shall not be 
considered as a mechanical factor which determines EU foreign policy but rather as 
a factor “creating the enabling conditions”, where courses of action in line with the 
identity may be agreed by member states with differing identities and interests.14 
Furthermore, EU interests do not exist per se but are the outcomes of discreet 
political processes, which involve member states with different interests and policy 
                                                 
11  See on this point Smith, Michael E. (2003), Europe’s Foreign and Security Policy: the 
Institutionalization of Cooperation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
12  Wallace, Helen (2000), ‘Europeanisation and Globalisation: Complementary or Contra-
dictory Trends?’, New Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 3, pp. 369-382.  
13   Hill, Christopher and William Wallace (1996), ‘Introduction: Actors and Actions’, in 
Christopher Hill (ed.), The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, London, Routledge, p. 8. 
14 Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2004), ‘Collective Identity’, in Walter Carlsnaes et al. (eds.), Contem-
porary European Foreign Policy, London, Sage Publication, p. 131. 
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preferences, as well as EU institutions and transnational groups.15 When discussing 
interests and policy preferences in the European context, it is therefore important to 
highlight the material and ethical interests that motivate member states to act at 
bilateral or at EU level and how “national preferences can become EU policy, and 
the effects that EU membership may have had on the preferences themselves”.16 
Finally, in order to be effective, a foreign policy shall turn into action through 
appropriate means. NPE has shown the importance of the peculiar ideational means 
that the EU employs as well as of its exemplarity. However, its insistence on the EU’s 
‘uniqueness’ has led to an overestimation of the EU’s international role for what it is 
rather than for what it does. The liberal constructivist approach applied to the 
European promotion of human rights can provide significant insights on the 
intentional, in contrast to the exemplar, ability of the EU and its member states to 
exercise influence. It considers the institutional settings of the EU and it analyses the 
interaction of member states with each other and with EU institutions at CFSP and EC 
level as well as the influence that these two levels exert on member states for the 
selection of the most appropriate policies within the three levels of governance. 
On the basis of the analytical and theoretical approach briefly outlined above 
and the tools that it offers for the study of European normative foreign policy, each 
of the next three sections deals with one of the levels of foreign policy governance 
identified: member states, CFSP and EC. Within each level, the policy outcome of 
the European promotion of human rights in China is explained through reference to 
the influence of the relevant internal processes and dynamics on the endogenously-
generated interests and policy preferences of four exemplar member states: 
Germany, France, the UK and Sweden.17 Each section considers meaningful case 
                                                 
 
15 Hyde-Price, op.cit., p. 102.  
16 Smith, Karen (2003), European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge, Polity 
Press, p. 17. 
17 The reasons behind this choice are threefold. First, Germany, France and the UK are the 
member states that have the deepest political and economic relations with China, whereas 
Sweden entered the EU only in 1995 pursues an allegedly more normative and ethical policy 
compared to those of other EU member states. Second, the four member states are also 
representative of four distinct approaches to human rights worldwide: Germany was the first 
European country to include political conditionality in its relations with developing countries; 
Sweden is the largest donor in relative terms in the field of human rights and democracy and 
i t  e p i t o m i s e s  t h e  E u r o p e a n  N o r d i c  a p p r o a c h  t o  s u c h  i s s u e s  b r o a d l y - s h a r e d  b y  D e n m a r k ,  
Finland and the Netherlands; par contre, France’s foreign policy resonates only limitedly of 
the new international human rights concerns and can be considered as exemplar of a 
Mediterranean approach also broadly shared by Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain; finally, 
with the inception of the Labour Party’s government in 1997, the UK’s relations with 
developing countries have been, although mostly only initially, characterized by Blair’s ethical 
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studies, namely the tabling of the resolution at the UN Commission for Human Rights 
(UNCHR), the arms embargo, the bilateral human rights dialogues and the projects in 
political aid. These were the main policies and instruments put in place by the EU 
and its member states to constructively engage China and promote human rights in 
the country since the first Commission Communication on China of 1995. 18 The 
Communication also marked the beginning of a ‘division of labour’ between the 
CFSP, in charge of pursuing a critical stance towards China, and the EC, responsible 
to apply positive conditionality to the country.19 This further justifies the analytical 
choice of distinguishing the three levels of foreign policy governance in European 
external relations. 
The remainder of this paper thus poses the questions proposed by Tocci’s study 
to the right subject matter. It analyses the interests, broadly defined to also includes 
norms, of all the main actors behind the European foreign policy and their mutual 
influence; it depicts the institutional settings where the actors interact and the 
specific instruments and competences they dispose of to act for the promotion of 
norms; finally, by showing the overall output of the European foreign policy-making 
system the analysis infers the actual effectiveness and impact of the European 
promotion of human rights in China. 
 
The CFSP Level and the Promotion of Human Rights in China 
This section critically analyses the activities of the CFSP level of governance in 
the promotion of human rights in China from the mid-1990s onwards. It highlights how 
the interaction within the newly-created CFSP influenced the member states’ 
interests and policy preferences over the issues of the annual resolution at the United 
                                                 
élan, that locates them somewhere between the German and the Swedish approach. Third, 
in the period taken into consideration (1995 to 2005), all four member states had stable and 
long-lasting government leaders and coalitions, thereby providing a constant against which 
the influence of external variables, in particular the evolving EU China policy, can be 
analysed: Chancellor Schroeder in Germany with his Social Democratic/Green coalition 
(1998-2002 and 2002-2005); President Chirac in France with his Neo-Gaullist Party (1995-2002 
and 2002-2007); Prime Minister Tony Blair in the United Kingdom with the Labour Party (1997-
2001, 2001-2005 and 2005-2007); and Prime Minister Göran Persson in Sweden with the Social 
Democratic Party (1996-1998, 1998-2002 and 2002-2006). 
18 European  Commission,  Communication from the Commission, A Long-Term Policy for 
China-Europe Relations, COM (1995) 279 final, Brussels, 5 July 1995. 
19  This interpretation was first put forward by Kay Möller (2002), ‘Diplomatic Relations and 
Mutual Strategic Perceptions: China and the European Union’, The China Quarterly, No. 169, 
pp. 10-32. 
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Nations Commission for Human Rights and the arms embargo. It shows how the 
member states’ decisions at the CFSP level were characterised by a tendency to 
converge on common positions but the socialisation that occurred was not in line 
with EU identity and thus not conducive to the elaboration of effective policies for 
the promotion of human rights in China. 
The UNCHR Case 
Starting from the year 1990, the EU and its member states had followed the 
practice of tabling or sponsoring resolutions critical of China at the annual meetings 
of the UN Commission for Human Rights.20 Yet, already in 1996, the unanimity behind 
such a policy had begun to show cracks. France and Germany, which at that time 
were developing deeper strategic and economic relations with China,21 questioned 
the usefulness of such an approach and pushed for a constructive engagement 
through projects and a more effective dialogue on human rights at EU level.22 On the 
other hand, the Nordic countries, which only had marginal economic interests 
towards China, were firmly opposed to the Franco-German stance, also pressed by 
their public opinions. They did not even budge in front of China’s open threats of 
political and commercial reprisals.23 Finally, interested in not creating new tensions 
with Beijing as the negotiations over Hong Kong’s return to China were coming to a 
close, the UK position swayed between the soft stance of Germany and France and 
the critical approach of the Nordic countries. 
The contrast between the two camps became apparent in 1997. In that year 
the Dutch Presidency of the Council put in place efforts to compose the divergences 
                                                 
20 Baker, Philip (2002), ‘Human Rights, Europe and the People’s Republic of China’, The China 
Quarterly, No. 169, 2002, pp. 45-63. 
21 In 1994 Germany released the landmark Asien Konzept, which became the reference for 
the subsequent German policy towards China. The document appreciated the importance 
of building a comprehensive strategic and economic relationship with China. In 1997 France 
and China signed a Comprehensive Partnership Agreement, which was characterised by a 
concern for the pursuit of multipolarity and the intention of the two parties to deepen their 
economic relations. 
22  In March 2006, during the Asia-EU Summit in Bangkok, diplomatic sources were quoted 
reporting that Chancellor Helmut Kohl, President Jacques Chirac and Premier Li Peng had 
struck a bargain in which China made certain commitments and promises in human rights for 
a pledge by Germany and France to oppose action in Geneva. Jendrzejczyk, Mike and Lotte 
Leicht (1997), ‘The Cave in at Geneva’, The Wall Street Journal, 14 April 1997. 
23 On the eve of the UNCHR session, the spokesman for the Chinese foreign minister, Shen 
Guofang, was reported affirming that “relations between China and Denmark will deteriorate, 
not only on the political but also on the economic front, if Denmark continues in its intention 
to present this resolution”. Agence Europe, 8 April 1997.  
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during the coordination meetings that preceded the UNCHR session.24 The coordina-
tion meetings are arenas where all member states meet before presenting their 
positions at the UNCHR. Although unanimity is not necessary in such a forum, the EU 
member states have become accustomed to try hard to find a common ground 
before the UNCHR session.25 Yet in 1997, no consensus was found and so Denmark, 
with the Netherlands’ support, went on alone to table the resolution, going headlong 
towards sanctions from Beijing. 
After this debacle, which encountered the harsh criticism of the European 
Parliament as well as of many human rights organizations, new attempts were made 
to present the EU with a single front during the next UNCHR. The British Presidency of 
the Council in 1998 brokered a compromise, although of a very low common 
denominator: no EU member state would table or co-sponsor a resolution against 
China but they would vote against no-action motions. This position was justified by 
China’s renewed readiness to sign international covenants on human rights, restart 
the EU-China Dialogue on Human Rights and agree on human rights projects with 
the EC and the member states. The 1998 Council resolution became the 
unquestioned policy of the EU and its member states at the UNCHR ever since, 
despite the United States’ vociferous criticism and the European Parliament’s 
requests for policy change in the ensuing years. 
In line with the framework developed above, the dismal result achieved at the 
UNCHR can be explained by the fact that the strategic and economic interests of 
some member states, justified on the basis of effectiveness in the promotion of 
human rights, changed the policy preferences of the other member states. This was 
possible for two reasons: one internal to the member states and one at the EU level. 
First, as exemplified by the case of Sweden, internal changes were occurring in 
the China policies of those member states traditionally in favour of more critical 
stances. In the case of Sweden, its membership of the EU helped Prime Minister 
Persson to justify a more pragmatic and business-oriented approach to China. As 
argued by Andrew Clapham, “the membership of the Union and the Unionization of 
                                                 
24 At a point the Dutch Presidency threatened the EU member states that it would not table 
any resolution against any country at the Geneva session of the UNCHR in order not to show 
double-standards toward influential and big countries versus poor and peripheral ones. 
Eventually, though, the threat did not materialize. 
25 Smith, Karen (2006), ‘Speaking with One Voice? European Union Co-ordination on Human 
Rights Issues at the United Nations’, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 
113-137. 
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the member states’ human rights foreign policy has arguably watered down the 
commitment of some of the more radical member states”.26 
Second, the UNCHR events demonstrate the tendency of EU member states to 
strive to reach common positions at the UNCHR and more generally at the CFSP level. 
Even if the Council’s resolution was not binding, the tendency of member states to 
reach a common position ‘entrapped’ those member states willing to critically 
approach China. Yet the convergence of positions should not be ascribed to inter-
governmental bargaining or the achievement of the lowest common denominator. 
It is rather explained by reference to the communicative practices adopted by those 
member states in favour of abandoning the UNCHR resolution. After 1998 all EU 
member states were socialised into abandoning the tabling of resolutions at the 
UNCHR to pursue an allegedly more effective and constructive approach.27 
To sum up, in the UNCHR case, some member states’ justification of their 
strategic and economic interests towards China through the use of an argumenta-
tive logic that showed the importance of a constructive and effective rather than 
just negative approach to the promotion of human rights in China won over those 
member states with marginal economic and strategic interests towards China, which 
would have been more prone to critical stances. 
The Arms Embargo 
While the UNCHR debacle was a clear sign of EU member states’ divergences 
on how to address the human rights issue in China and of the failure of coordinating 
a ‘normative’ common position, the arms embargo has often been portrayed by EU 
and member states officials as an issue where unanimity exists and the EU is 
conducting a normative foreign policy towards China. Yet, even at this level, it was 
rather the inability to reach unanimity that brought about the ‘normative’ result of 
not lifting the arms embargo. Seven years after the UNCHR debacle, in 2004 and 
2005 the EU member states proved once again unable to speak with a firm single 
voice. 
                                                 
26  Clapham, Andrew (1999), ‘Where Is the EU’s Human Rights Common Foreign Policy’, in 
Philip Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 645. 
27 This socialisation process was evident in several instances which occurred after 1998 and 
which I have further analysed in Balducci, Giuseppe (2008), The European Promotion of 
Human Rights in China: Interests, Processes and Outcomes, Ph.D. Thesis submitted at the 
University of Warwick, September 2008. 
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It is interesting to note that the support for the arms embargo had begun to fray 
at the same time as the decision to abandon the UNCHR resolution was maturing. 
Once again, the two member states more active in pushing for acquiescing at 
Chinese requests were Germany and France, or more precisely, Schroeder and 
Chirac.28 At the European Council held in Brussels on 12 December 2003, the two 
leaders proposed the lifting of the arms embargo, motivating it on the basis of 
China’s improvements in the respect of human rights since Tiananmen.29 At an early 
stage, it seemed that their actions would yield positive results since, in principle, EU 
member states had agreed to initiate discussions on the issue. However, already on 
that occasion, some doubts were raised in particular by the executives of the Nordic 
countries, which – although reluctant to break the growing European consensus 
towards the lifting of the embargo – at the same time did not have the support of 
their legislatives. 
In addition, two other issues needed to be solved: the elaboration of a new 
code of conduct and the firm resistance of the US. The first issue was almost success-
fully tackled in the first months of 2005 with the Council’s adoption of a new version 
of the Common Military List and the member states’ adoption of the User’s Guide to 
E U  C o d e  o f  C o n d u c t  o n  A r m s  E x p o r t s . 30 However, the second obstacle proved 
insurmountable as the US put in place numerous initiatives to discourage EU member 
states to lift the arms embargo, in particular threatening to sanction such a move 
with restrictions on technology transfers to EU member states. At this point, due to its 
special relationship with the US, even Britain, which previously had come around the 
Franco-German proposal, had to step back from its support. Following this evolution 
it was easier for the reluctant Nordic states to inflict the final blow to the attempt of 
lifting the arms embargo in 2005. 
The US initiative did certainly play an important role in influencing the final 
decisions of the EU member states. Yet another external variable should be factored 
in: China’s passing of the ‘anti-secession law’ in 2005, authorising military force 
against Taiwan if it declared formal independence from the PRC. EU officials began 
                                                 
28  Casarini, Nicola (2006), ‘The Evolution of the EU-China Relationship: from Constructive 
Engagement to Strategic Partnership’, Occasional Paper, No. 64, Paris, EU Institute for Security 
Studies. 
29 Ibid., p. 31. 
30 European Council, User’s Guide to the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, 5179/1/06 
Rev. 1, PESC 18, COARM 1, Brussels, 19.4.2006(b).  
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t o  f e e l  u n e a s y  i n  l i g h t  o f  s u c h  a  m o v e  and the parliaments of the Scandinavian 
countries became very vocal against the lifting. 
However, the international events and the influence of the US alone are not 
sufficient to explain the policy outcome because the arms embargo is not a legally-
binding act and some member states could have decided to lift it without the 
unanimity of all the member states. The internal situation should then be considered. 
First, it is important to note that in 2004 the UK took over the EU Presidency. In this role 
it operated as a ‘conveyor belt’ to transmit the US concerns to those member states 
in favour of lifting the arms embargo. Secondly, in several Scandinavian countries the 
incumbent governments had been under strong pressures to change their policy at 
EU level. In the case of Sweden, for example, Prime Minister Persson was not given 
the mandate to lift the arms embargo. Similar difficulties were encountered by the 
Dutch and Danish governments. 
Therefore, international and internal pressures shall be considered when 
explaining the EU decision to postpone the lifting of the arms embargo. The influence 
of external factors must be interpreted through the filter of the EU because the 
importance attached by member states to the achievement of a consensus, either 
for preserving a unitary EU policy towards China or for avoiding unilateral retaliations, 
led to the capitulation of some of the major EU member states, such as Germany 
and France. Strikingly, in the case of the arms embargo, it was the major EU member 
states that had to change their policy preferences to maintain the EU consensus. 
In the two cases of the UNCHR and the arms embargo, it has thus emerged that 
although all member states framed their interests and policy preferences towards 
China in terms of human rights, the final policy outcome was determined by the 
tendency to converge at the CFSP level rather than by a shared European 
consensus over human rights promotion, as constructivist authors often argue. 31 
Similarly, while external pressures were strong, their influence alone is insufficient to 
explain the policy outcome. In fact, the explanation of the policy outcome requires 
considering the internal processes and dynamics of the CFSP level and the existing 
tendency to converge above all. This led to an ambiguous policy, which was 
accommodating at the UNCHR level but was critical over the issue of the arms 
embargo. 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Sedelmeier, Ulrich (2004), ‘Collective Identity’, in Walter Carlsnaes et al. 
(eds.), Contemporary European Foreign Policy, London, Sage Publication, pp. 122-139. 
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The European Community Level and the Promotion of Human Rights in China 
This section deals with the EC level of governance and shows in particular the 
interaction between the Commission and the member states in the promotion of 
human rights in China through trade negotiations in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) on the one side and development assistance on the other. As argued above, 
the 1995 Commission Communication represented a de facto division of responsi-
bilities for human rights promotion between the CFSP, which was ostensibly in charge 
of maintaining a critical approach towards China, and the EC, which was entrusted 
with the pursuit of positive conditionality. This finds its explanation not only in the 
strategic and economic interests of the major EU China partners, but also in the 
bureaucratic interests of the Commission, as will be shown below.  
China’s WTO Accession 
In the first part of the 1990s, the Commission signalled a supportive attitude 
towards China’s entry into the GATT/WTO. In 1992, some member states, in particular 
Germany and France, and Commission officials, in particular in the Directorate-
General Trade, began to propose transitional periods for smoothening China’s 
accession to the WTO. 32 The role of opening negotiations with China was fully 
endorsed by Trade Commissioner Leon Brittan, who from the early 1990s began to 
show the Commission’s support for China’s entry into GATT, and at a later stage into 
the WTO as a founding member. In doing so, he also expressed a less confrontational 
attitude towards the issue of human rights and the domestic situation of the country 
in line with some member states’ doubts over the effectiveness of the critical stance 
adopted by the EC after 1989 and its damaging potential for their bilateral relations. 
While paying lip-service to the democratic cause, during meetings with Chinese 
authorities Commissioner Brittan was quick to set human rights issues aside and 
defuse their confrontational potential.  
The Commission’s focus on the economic dimension could be interpreted in 
realist terms, as determined by the influence of the main EU China partners’ 
economic interests, especially those of France and Germany. Yet, it appears that this 
                                                 
32 Although at an early stage these proposals were not met with favour in Washington, they 
nonetheless marked the inception of a more flexible European approach towards China and 
eventually represent the biggest contribution of the EU to China’s entry into the WTO. See 
Bridges, Brian (1999), Europe and the Challenge of the Asia Pacific, London, Macmillan Press, 
pp. 102-105. 
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is only one side of the explanation. Another important factor rests in the compe-
tences and actual powers of the Commission. While the Maastricht Treaty and the 
Amsterdam Treaty had failed to grant a deeper political unity to the newly-born EU, it 
had strengthened the EC level and the Commission’s competences in trade relations. 
In particular the Amsterdam Treaty extended the scope of the common commercial 
policy from goods to negotiations on services and intellectual property rights.  
Therefore, the Commission had an incentive in supporting and trying to 
Europeanize the positions of those member states that were more inclined towards 
constructively engaging China in human rights and reaping the economic benefits 
of China’s entry into GATT/WTO. And indeed, the Commission did just that through its 
subsequent Communications, which overemphasised the economic dimension of EU 
relations with China and proposed a liberal argument that predicated that China 
would change politically through economic growth and its accession to the 
GATT/WTO.33 The ‘constructive engagement’ thus proposed by the 1995 Communi-
cation led to a de facto division of responsibilities between the CFSP and the 
Commission. In a sense, EU officials seemed to have appreciated the Chinese 
requests of de-linking trade from human rights issues. The member states’ approval of 
the Communication gave a carte blanche to the Commission to exert all its 
prerogatives during the GATT/WTO negotiations unhindered by human rights issues, 
while demonstrating a practical engagement through well-marketed development 
assistance initiatives on the ground. 
During the EC-China WTO negotiations human rights were neither raised by EU 
member states nor by the Commission. In the final five years of negotiations for 
China’s WTO accession no member states in the Council put forward the idea that 
China’s entry should be linked to the respect of human rights and more specifically 
labour rights, as it had been repeatedly requested by the European Parliament, 
trade union lobbies and European NGOs. Similarly, the Commission did neither have 
competence nor any guideline to link trade and human rights in its negotiations with 
China.34 The result was that the Commission could not be confrontational on the 
issue with China either. It should also be noted that if any intention existed to link 
trade and human rights, the EU had a powerful instrument, at least in theory, through 
                                                 
33 European  Commission,  Communication from the Commission, A Long-Term Policy for 
China-Europe Relations, op.cit. 
34 Eglin, Marina (1997), ‘China’s Entry into the WTO with a Little Help from the EU’, International 
Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 3, pp. 489-508. 
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which it could exert its power: the request to negotiate a new Partnership Agree-
ment with China, which would include a human rights clause. But neither member 
states nor the Commission pushed for the negotiation of such a new agreement. 
In the field of trade, it thus emerges that the Commission, motivated by its 
bureaucratic interests, played an important role in defusing the confrontational 
charges of human rights and de-linking them from trade. For that purpose, it 
Europeanized the stances of those member states, in particular Germany and 
France, that had major economic interests towards China. However, this had an 
overall negative impact on the European promotion of human rights in China. It 
limited the ability of those member states more prone to critically confront the 
country through economic and trade means, and it imposed the constructive 
approach supported mostly by Germany and France. 
Projects on the Ground 
In the mid-1990s, following the embracement of the constructive engagement, 
China and the EC agreed on cooperation programmes designed to strengthen the 
rule of law and to promote civil, political, economic and social rights. These initiatives 
fall within the EC development assistance. In development cooperation the 
Commission shares competences with the member states, which implies that both of 
them conduct their development policies according to the objectives laid out by 
the EC Treaty (Art. 177 TEC). The Treaties compel the Commission and the member 
states to articulate their policies according to the principles of coherence, 
complementarity and coordination in order to achieve an overall effective 
European development approach. 
Among the initiatives financed by the Commission in China, two programmes, 
the EU-China Legal and Judicial Cooperation (LJC) Programme and the EU-China 
Village Governance Training (VGT) Programme, became the largest cooperation 
initiatives of the Chinese government in the fields of social development and 
governance. The LJC Programme took off in 2000 and it was structured along the 
following components: training components, which included the exchanges of 
lawyers (9-month course in Europe), the training for judges and prosecutors (three-
month exposure to European practice in the legal process), the visitors’ programme 
for key legal officials focusing on various themes (four-week study tour in Europe), 
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and the Directors’ facility, a small grant component (Euro 1.8 million) supporting a 
wide range of small but high impact co-operation activities in the legal field.35 
The LJC Programme ran for five years. From fieldwork carried out by the author, 
it appears that it had a merely technical and economic approach, mostly stressing 
civil, commercial and administrative law, paying very little attention to issues of 
human rights such as criminal code, due process of law, protection of minorities 
etc. 36  Besides, the LJC Programme boiled down to the training of officials, 
professionals and academics, who often did not show any independence from the 
government. Thus it is difficult to imagine how such officials could play the role of 
catalysts for change, as argued by the glossy project brochures. 
The VGT Programme formally took off only in 2001 but further delays in the 
implementation phase occurred due to misunderstandings on how to implement it. 
Once the VGT Programme started, the contents were disseminated and then several 
provinces applied for funding. Eventually seven pilot provinces were identified and 
selected through open calls: Yunnan, Helongjiang, Gansu, Shandong, Liaoning, 
Henan, and Jiangxi. In each pilot project, collaborations were established with the 
local department of the Ministry of Civil Affairs. Provincial trainers were educated in 
approaches, methodologies and contents.  
Overall, it appears that the VGT Programme achieved its stated goals and 
served to build an important basis with all the material prepared, people trained and 
applied research carried out. Yet, it remains to be seen whether the impact of the 
Programme was only localized in the few pilot provinces or whether it had a national 
impact. The fact that – despite Chinese requests – the EU decided not to follow up 
with the VGT Programme seems to point to two issues: first, the results were not as 
enthusing as it emerged in the interviews carried out by the author with EU officials, 
and secondly, EC officials and member states changed their policy priorities towards 
China considering that such types of programmes were no longer in line with their 
strategies.37 
Notwithstanding the mixed results of development cooperation initiatives in the 
human rights and rule of law sectors, the EC emerged as one of the most significant 
donors in these fields. However, little complementarity seemed to exist with the 
                                                 
35 European Commission (2007), Evaluation of the European Commission’s Cooperation and 
Partnership with the People’s Republic of China, Country Level Evaluation, 2nd Draft Final 
Synthesis Report, March 2007, p. 88.  
36 Balducci, op.cit. 
37 Ibid. 
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national development policies of the member states, which leads to argue that the 
EC activities resembled those of a ‘sixteenth member state’ rather than being 
complementary to those of its member states. This was confirmed indirectly by an 
internal evaluation report which concludes that coordination between EC and 
member states is strong in form but weak in substance:  
Donor coordination within the democratic governance sector is a 
challenge. There is no evidence that, apart from sharing 
information with the EU member states, the EC has made efforts to 
take a lead role in political and policy dialogue processes on 
democratic governance (or HR and rule of law).38 
 
The lack of coordination and complementarity did not only have a negative 
impact in terms of effectiveness, but considering the delegation of responsibilities of 
member states in political aid to the EC level, which is shown in the next section, it 
provides a negative assessment of EC influence on the European consistency and 
coherence in the promotion of human rights in China. 
All in all, the story that emerges from this section is that in line with its main 
competences and bureaucratic interests, the Commission effectively tried to build 
an EU agenda, which would give it primacy in EU relations with China. In the case of 
trade, this led the Commission to become the most important institutional actor in EU-
China relations, even though this resulted in the de-linking of human rights from trade. 
In the case of development assistance the Commission put in place quantitatively 
significant initiatives, but their lack of focus on human rights undermined their ability 
to achieve the effective contribution in the field stated by the Commission. Moreover, 
the fact that the Commission played the role of a ‘sixteenth member state’ (due to 
the little coordination and complementarity of its activities with those of the member 
states) negatively affected the overall impact of the European promotion of human 
rights in China through development aid. 
 
The Member States Level and the Promotion of Human Rights in China 
This section critically analyses the policies and bilateral activities for the 
promotion of human rights in China of four exemplar EU member states, namely 
Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Sweden since the year 1995, which 
                                                 
38European Commission (2007), Evaluation of the European Commission’s Cooperation and 
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marked the beginning of the EU’s constructive engagement with China. It 
concentrates on their bilateral dialogues and projects in development aid. In each 
member state’s approach to the promotion of human rights in China a sidelining of 
concerns for human rights emerges. More specifically, membership of the EU was 
conducive to processes of delegation of responsibilities to the EU level. 
Bilateral Dialogues 
Germany started a Rule of Law Dialogue in 1999 under the auspices of Gerhard 
Schroeder. It involved the German Ministry of Justice and provided a venue for an 
exchange of ideas and opinions between Chinese and German top-level justice 
representatives. Interestingly, while the Dialogue does not seem to have been 
substantive and only fulfilled ‘protocol functions’, its inception allegedly led to a 
change in the structure of responsibility for German-Chinese legal cooperation.39 
According to Nicole Schulte Kulkmann, the Dialogue constituted “an effort to 
centralize legal cooperation activities with the PRC under the aegis of the 
Chancellor”.40 Considering that “Schroeder’s policy towards China was the most 
heavily criticized area of policy after 2000” for its business-oriented approach, it is 
difficult not to infer that the centralisation of legal activities in the hands of the 
Chancellor diluted the human rights component in favour of a stress on economic 
rule of law.41 Finally, it is interesting to note that the dialogue was centred on rule of 
law, somewhat implying that human rights were already dealt with at EU level, as 
German officials often pointed out during this author’s fieldwork. 
France, which had led EU member states to abandon the tabling of the UNCHR 
resolution in 1997, did not even enter into a behind-the-door dialogue approach to 
human rights and rule of law. As indicated in the Comprehensive Partnership 
Agreement signed with China in 1997, France pointed to the EU as the most suitable 
level to discuss the human rights issue with China, thus entirely delegating the 
responsibilities of a normative foreign policy to the EU level. The only appearance of 
human rights concerns was represented by the intermittent reference to some 
                                                 
39 Schulte Kulkmann, Nicole (2005), ‘The German-Chinese “Rule of Law Dialogue”’, in Marco 
Overhaus, Hanns W. Maull and Sebastian Harnisch (eds.), German Chinese Relations: Trade 
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40 Ibid. 
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political refugees and the request for their liberation, which sometimes featured in 
President Chirac’s statements during his visits in China. 
Tony Blair’s government, which had started with the lofty proposal of an ethical 
foreign policy, created a bilateral human rights dialogue with China in 1999 but this 
only added a formal vestige to the previous political dialogue. 42 The dialogue 
encountered strong criticism both from the House of Commons and from NGOs for its 
lack of transparency and inability to achieve concrete results. Besides, an addition of 
a behind-closed-door formality was countered by the dismissal of a perhaps more 
important formality, this time open and public, which was represented by the British 
support for the tabling of a resolution at the UNCHR.43 Against internal criticism, the 
Prime Minister defended his government by embracing the EU mantra of 
effectiveness. Interestingly, he affirmed that “a United Nations resolution was not the 
right way to proceed”,44 although he had maintained just the opposite a year earlier 
in the presentation of his China policy. At the same time, his Secretary of State, Robin 
Cook, “argued that the blame for the decision should be put on France, which broke 
EU ranks in 1997, and was rewarded with lucrative Airbus contracts”, indirectly 
implying that the UK’s economic competition with France in China was a more 
important goal than pursuing the promised ethical foreign policy.45 
Finally, Sweden attempted several times to establish a bilateral dialogue on 
human rights with China. For long only consultations on human rights were held with 
Chinese authorities and Swedish officials tried hard to link the initiatives on the 
ground to a more structured political dialogue on human rights. More formal 
consultations on human rights only began in 2006, although during this author’s 
fieldwork it emerged that the Chinese often pointed to the presence of the EU-China 
Human Rights Dialogue as a reason for not upgrading the consultations. Eventually, 
Sweden did not succeed in establishing a formal human rights dialogue with China. 
                                                 
42 The Dialogue was held twice a year, although the Chinese recently demonstrated their 
willingness to bring it down to one. The Chinese counterpart was the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
but it also included other line ministries’ representatives at director-general level, such as the 
Ministry of Justice and Public Security. The dialogue was matched with legal expert seminars 
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43 See the criticism expressed in the House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Select Committee, UK 
Relations with China, London, HMSO, 2000. 
44 Quoted in Reuters News, ‘UK Faces Attacks over Chinese Human Rights Stance’, 11 March 
1998. 
45 Quoted in The Times, ‘Rights and Wrongs - The EU Has Sheathed a Useful Weapon in Dealing 
with China’, 13 March 1998. 
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From this brief overview of the four selected member states’ dialogues with 
China it is interesting to note that most of them mainly served public relations 
purposes because they merely showed the member governments’ commitment to 
discuss human rights in China with no concrete results. This is evidenced by the fact 
that their procedures remained opaque and the contents of the real discussions 
taking place were kept secret. Similarly, membership of the EU and the existence of 
the EU-China Dialogue on Human Rights allowed the majority of the member states 
involved in the dialogues to leave critical issues to be discussed at EU level, thus 
delegating responsibilities and concentrating on less divisive issues such as the rule of 
law. In fact, the presence of an EU-China Human Rights Dialogue even allowed 
some countries, like France, to avoid the headaches of a dialogue altogether. 
Projects on the Ground 
Germany’s initiatives in China in the field of human rights and rule of law started 
under Chancellor Schroeder’s government. Nicole Schulte Kulkmann notes that in 
those years “Schroeder was eager to start such activities in response to criticism 
towards his China policy”.46 Similarly, Chinese authorities were interested in receiving 
foreign support in restructuring China’s legal and judicial systems in order to align the 
country with international standards and in particular make it ready for accession to 
the WTO. Yet, the fact that these projects were all concentrated on ‘economic’ or 
‘business’ sectors cannot be overlooked.47 In line with the internal criticism against 
Schroeder as a business promoter in China, it can be argued that these initiatives 
had more to do with the promotion of a rule of law familiar to German companies 
than the support for human rights. 
France started activities in the field of political aid in 1996. Differently from other 
donors’ activities in the field of human rights and rule of law, France’s initiatives were 
not concentrated on either support for law drafting and enforcement or protection 
of human rights and fundamental liberties through, for example, activities carried out 
by NGOs. French activities mostly fell within a training and academic exchange-
focused approach.48 They all had a French flavour attached, as if it was French 
culture and approach rather than the support of human rights and rule of law and 
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their best practices that really mattered. Such projects were functional to increase 
cooperation between French and Chinese institutions and to create links between 
Chinese key officials and French authorities in key legal sectors of interest for France. 
In the UK’s relations with China, the sensitive fields of promoting human rights 
and rule of law were not dealt with by the Department for International 
Development (DfID). These projects were left to other public organizations, namely 
the Great Britain China Centre and the British Council. These organizations greatly 
benefited from the funding offered by the Foreign Commonwealth Office, which, 
starting from the mid-1990s, provided financial means in grant form initially through 
the Human Rights Project Fund and more recently through its offspring, the Global 
Opportunity Fund. The projects carried out in China were narrowly centred around 
five main priorities: (i) abolition of death penalty, (ii) combating torture, (iii) freedom 
of expression, (iv) rule of law and (v) child’s rights.49 Although timid and limited in their 
efforts, these projects proved a certain level of attention for human rights issues in 
China from the British side. However, it should be noted that they represented only a 
very small part of the UK’s grant contribution to China and the DfID’s lack of any 
projects in the field of human rights is symptomatic of a certain negligence and 
delegation of responsibilities to non-governmental organizations and the EC. 
Sweden’s activities in China in the human rights and rule of law sector were 
financed by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) but almost all of 
them were carried out by the Raul Wallenberg Institute, which is an independent 
institution affiliated with Lund University. 50 The activities of the Raul Wallenberg 
Institute began in 1996 upon invitation by Chinese officials at the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. Until the early 2000s, the activities were carried out on an ad hoc basis and 
mostly in response to practical requests put forward by the Chinese authorities. A 
more strategic approach began in the early 2000s with the opening of an office in 
Beijing to develop local contacts and formulate a programme of activities. Similarly, 
the demand-driven approach was substituted by a more proactive stance pursued 
by SIDA as well as by the Raul Wallenberg Institute representatives in the PRC, which 
led SIDA’s portfolio of activities in China to be evenly distributed in the environmental 
and human rights sectors. It thus appears that on the ground, Sweden deepened its 
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efforts in the promotion of human rights in China, as reflected by the proportion of 
funds allocated and the pioneering activities carried out.51 In such activities Sweden 
often coordinated its efforts with other Nordic EU member states. Unfortunately, the 
same cannot be said for coordination and complementarity with other EU member 
states and the EC itself. 
This brief overview of the EU member states’ projects on the ground evidences 
three main issues: first, the initiatives were badly coordinated among member states 
as duplication of similar projects shows. Second, they were not coordinated with 
those of the European Commission, which was unable to articulate a unitary 
European strategy on the ground. Finally, the presence of the EC projects allowed 
most member states to carry out activities often more worthwhile for their national 
(read economic) interests, i.e. the promotion of a business rule of law and the 
creation of networks between institutions, while delegating the responsibilities to 
critically engage China in EC projects. 
All in all, this section has shown that the bilateral policies of the four exemplar 
member states for the promotion of human rights towards China were not only 
influenced by their specific interests and policy preferences but also by their 
membership of the EU. The combination of endogenously generated interests and EU 
membership shaped member states’ bilateral activities in human rights promotion in 
China. For the purpose of this paper, it is necessary to point out that the influence 
was negative for the promotion of human rights in China. In fact, membership of the 
EU generally led to a delegation of responsibilities and a dilution of commitment, 
even for traditionally committed member states. 
 
Conclusion: Limits of NPE 
This paper has attempted to contribute to the contemporary literature on the 
normative dimension of EU foreign policy. It has done so by exploring the inside of 
Normative Power Europe in order to rectify the two major shortcomings identified in 
the literature, i.e. reductionism and reification. By proposing a broad analytical 
conceptualisation of European foreign policy and elaborating a suitable theoretical 
framework to study it, this paper has proven the necessity to reframe Nathalie Tocci’s 
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three research questions on interests, means and impact, to apply them to the 
appropriate subject matter and to assess the normativeness of EU foreign policy. 
The analysis of the three levels of European foreign policy governance has 
shown that member states and EU institutions had and still have heterogeneous 
interests when it comes to the promotion of human rights in China. The interaction of 
such interests within the European foreign policy-making system did not lead to 
normative convergence. This was due to the internal dynamics at play in each level 
of governance in the European foreign policy system, which influenced the selection 
of the most appropriate policies and instruments for the promotion of human rights in 
China.  
Yet, one type of convergence did occur: EU institutions and some member 
states reinforced each others’ approaches towards China, which stressed economic 
interests over the ideational motives of human rights, and succeeded in imposing 
them to all the other member states. This leads me to argue that the overall 
European human rights policy towards China did not have a normative character 
and even less a normative impact in line with the EU principles and norms for human 
rights promotion abroad. 
From a broader perspective, it appears that failing to elaborate and maintain a 
consistent and coherent European human rights policy towards the PRC does not 
bode well for the European attempts to support the establishment of a human rights 
regime in Asia. As the economic dimension remains the most preponderant in the EU 
and member states’ relations with several Asian countries, it can be maintained that 
the European influence on the normative issue of human rights may not be 
significant in Asia. However, this does not mean that the EU and its member states 
may not succeed in having a normative impact in Asia on other issues at the core of 
EU foreign policy, such as multilateralism and environmental sustainability. In order to 
analyse these issues, this paper suggests a theoretical and analytical framework that 
can shed light on the actual interests,  policy means and impact of a European, 
rather than EU, normative foreign policy. 
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